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SEIZE FIRST, SEARCH LATER: THE HUNT FOR DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
 
People v. DeProspero1 
  (decided March 26, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of computers in criminal activity has popularized a 
new form of evidence known as digital evidence.  Police officers and 
law enforcement agents now commonly seize and search computers in 
connection with criminal investigations, the evidence obtained from 
which is often critical to securing convictions.  Computer searches, 
however, are much different from ordinary searches for physical evi-
dence due to the complexity of information stored within a computer 
or hard drive as well as the technical expertise required to retrieve such 
evidence.  Often times, the police seize a suspect’s computer and take 
it to a police laboratory for extensive examination by forensics experts.  
These forensic examinations may take days, months, or even years.2 
Currently, there are no bright line rules governing the scope of 
the police search or the amount of time law enforcement may ordinari-
ly retain the seized property before returning it to a suspect.  Not sur-
prisingly, there have been many challenges to the constitutionality of 
computer searches, especially in the context of child pornography—in 
which the evidence found on a suspect’s computer can be highly in-
criminating.  Courts have grappled with these challenges and have at-
tempted to apply constitutional restraints to ensure that the scope and 
execution of these searches fall within the limits prescribed by the 
 
1 987 N.E.2d 264 (N.Y. 2013). 
2 See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV 279, 300-01 (2005) (emphasis added) (explaining the need for current laws to be amend-
ed so as to strike the proper balance between law enforcement needs and individual rights in 
property and privacy in light of existing technological realities). 
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Fourth Amendment.3 
Despite varying approaches to this issue, courts and legislatures 
need not create new rules to address these concerns.  Rather, existing 
Fourth Amendment principles can be applied in the context of comput-
er forensic searches.  These principles appropriately balance an indi-
vidual’s privacy interests with the state’s interest in conducting a thor-
ough search of digital evidence to protect society from sexual 
predators.  The goal, then, is to strike a fair balance between the state’s 
interest in protecting society from sexual predators and the privacy 
concerns that are part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment.  If effec-
tive law enforcement requires forensic computer searches, then these 
searches should be permitted.  However, investigators should begin the 
forensic analysis expeditiously and return any property that does not 
contain incriminating evidence “within a reasonable period of time.”4  
Because the facts and circumstances differ in each case, what is con-
sidered reasonable in one situation may not be considered reasonable 
in another.  Therefore, the reasonableness of an electronic forensics 
search should be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
This case note will discuss the issue presented to the New York 
State Court of Appeals in People v. DeProspero—whether a subse-
quent forensic analysis of the defendant’s computer, performed ap-
proximately seven months after the computer was initially seized and 
after the defendant had already served a prison sentence on related 
charges, violated the Fourth Amendment.5 
II. PEOPLE V. DEPROSPERO 
A. Factual & Procedural Background 
In 2008 and 2009, an undercover New York State Police detec-
tive investigated individuals sharing child pornography on the Internet 
 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
4 Kerr, supra note 2, at 313 (emphasis added). 
5 DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 265-66. 
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through various file-sharing networks.6  A particular IP address was 
suspected of downloading child pornography files over forty times be-
tween February and March of 2009.7  The investigator confirmed that 
the downloaded images contained child pornography and traced the IP 
address to DeProspero’s home.8  Based on that investigation, the police 
obtained a search warrant authorizing a search of the defendant’s home 
and the seizure of his computers and electronics, including “keyboards, 
printers, modems, scanners, or digital cameras and their internal or ex-
ternal storage media.”9  When police officers searched DeProspero’s 
home on May 5, 2009, they discovered a digital image of a female 
child performing oral sex on a male adult on his computer.10  The de-
fendant was arrested, and the police seized his computer as well as two 
digital cameras.11 
The electronics seized from the defendant’s home pursuant to 
the May 2009 warrant were not promptly taken to the State Police 
Crime Laboratory for a forensic examination.12  Mistakenly believing 
that the only evidence against the defendant was the image of child 
pornography found on his computer during the search, the Assistant 
District Attorney (“ADA”) offered DeProspero a light prison sen-
tence—six months—and ten years of probation in exchange for his 
plea of guilty to possession of child pornography.13  The defendant 
immediately accepted the offer and was sentenced on November 2, 
2009.14 
After sentencing, DeProspero’s attorney contacted the ADA 
and requested the return of the electronics that were seized during the 
search of the defendant’s home in May 2009.15  Before returning the 
defendant’s property, however, the ADA instructed the New York 
State Police to examine it to ensure that it was free of contraband.16  
 
6 People v. DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2011). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 791-92. 
10 Id. at 792. 
11 DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 792. 
12 Id. 
13 Id.  See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.16 (McKinney 2013) (“A person is guilty of pos-
sessing a sexual performance by a child when . . . he knowingly has in his possession or con-
trol, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any performance which includes sexual con-
duct by a child less than sixteen years of age.”). 
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Upon fully examining the contents of the seized property, the police 
discovered hundreds of pornographic images and videos of children on 
the defendant’s computer, as well as a deleted video clip on one of the 
defendant’s digital cameras.17  Hundreds of still-frame images were re-
covered from the deleted video clip, depicting the defendant engaged 
in oral sex with an autistic male child about twelve years old.18 
DeProspero was indicted on one count of predatory sexual as-
sault against a child and four counts of criminal sexual acts in the first 
degree.19  He sought to suppress the evidence seized from his computer 
and camera on the grounds that the May 2009 search warrant had ex-
pired by the time investigators searched his computer in January 
2010.20  He argued that the warrant was no longer supported by proba-
ble cause and that the police lacked jurisdiction to search his computer 
and camera once the first criminal proceeding against him had termi-
nated.21 
The Oneida County Court denied the defendant’s motion to 
suppress the evidence recovered from the camera and computer, and 
determined that the May 2009 search warrant was supported by proba-
ble cause.22  The court acknowledged that this case presented an issue 
of first impression—whether the delayed analysis of lawfully seized 
property constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.23  However, it concluded that there was “nothing inherently 
wrong or improper about a delayed analysis or inspection of property 
that has been lawfully seized.”24  According to the court, the search did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment because the defendant did not have 




19 DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 792.  See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.96 (McKinney 
2006): 
A person is guilty of predatory sexual assault against a child when, being 
eighteen years old or more, he or she commits the crime of rape in the 
first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated sexual 
abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a child in 
the first degree, as defined in this article, and the victim is less than thir-
teen years old. 
Id. 
20 DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 792. 
21 Id. 
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his home.25  Although there was approximately a seven-month delay 
between the search of the defendant’s home and the forensic search of 
the seized property, the court concluded that “the May 2009 warrant 
continued to provide probable cause for the subsequent search.”26  
Thus, the police had no obligation to obtain a second search warrant in 
order to conduct a complete forensic analysis of the property seized in 
May 2009.27  In other words, the court deemed that the search warrant 
was valid through, and including, the time the police thoroughly 
searched the defendant’s property. 
DeProspero pleaded guilty to predatory sexual assault against a 
child after the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence.28  He 
was sentenced to a term of eighteen years to life and subsequently ap-
pealed his conviction.29  The Fourth Department of the Appellate Divi-
sion affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New 
York State Court of Appeals.30 
B. The New York Court of Appeals Decision 
The issue presented to the Court of Appeals was whether the 
January 2010 forensic examination of the defendant’s computer and 
cameras constituted a legal search and seizure.31  Specifically, whether 
the authority provided by the May 2009 warrant had expired—and in 
the absence of new judicial authorization, whether the delayed forensic 
examination was illegal and the evidence obtained from it inadmissi-
ble.32  The defendant alleged that the prosecution resulting in his Sep-
tember 2009 conviction had run its course and the seized items were 
no longer useful in that or any other criminal proceeding.33  Thus, be-
cause there was no outstanding criminal matter that needed to be re-
solved, he argued that the contents of the digital camera had become 
irrelevant and, as a result, his legitimate expectation of privacy had 
 
25 DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 793.  See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 
(1967) (providing that Fourth Amendment protections turn on the absence or presence of an 
expectation of privacy). 
26 DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 793. 
27 Id. 
28 DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 264. 
29 DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 793. 
30 DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 265. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 266. 
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been restored.34 
The New York State Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s 
arguments and upheld the judgment of the Appellate Division.35  The 
court began its analysis with the proposition that Fourth Amendment 
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures are “prevalent-
ly understood to protect what an individual may legitimately expect to 
keep private against unwarranted intrusion by agents of the state.”36  A 
proponent of a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation must be able 
to allege a legitimate expectation of privacy in the places or items said 
to have been illegally searched or seized.37  In applying this standard, 
the court found that the defendant in this case had no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy at the time of the forensic examination.38  Although 
the initial criminal matter against the defendant had been resolved, the 
authority of the May 2009 warrant did not vanish at the time of the fo-
rensic search.  The court explained: 
It is manifest that the continued validity of a search 
warrant . . . is not necessarily tied to the pendency of 
any particular prosecution.  The duration of a warrant’s 
authority is more appropriately measured by the persis-
tence of the cause for its issue.  Here, the predicate for 
the seizure and examination of defendant’s digital me-
dia devices was at least as compelling in January 2010 
as it had been in May 2009.  This being so, there ap-
pears no reason to conclude that the warrant did not at 
the time of the state laboratory examination remain val-
id and allow both the State’s continued custody of the 
seized property and the “lesser-related intrusion” in-
volved in that property’s inspection.39 
In the court’s view, nothing had happened since the seizure of 
DeProspero’s property to “diminish the cause for the warrant’s is-
sue.”40  Accordingly, the warrant remained valid at the time of the fo-
rensic examination, and the defendant had no relevant expectation of 
 
34 Id. 
35 DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 265. 
36 Id. at 266 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 350). 
37 Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). 
38 Id. at 267. 
39 Id. at 266-67. 
40 DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 266. 
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privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.41 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
ELECTRONICS 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
tects “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”42  Warrants to execute a search or seizure must 
be issued “upon probable cause . . . and particularly describ[e] the 
place to be searched . . . or things to be seized.”43  The Supreme Court 
has stated that the particularity requirement for a warrant was designed 
to ensure that “those searches deemed necessary . . . [are] as limited as 
possible.”44  Furthermore, “[t]he requirement that warrants shall par-
ticularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under 
them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant 
[that describes] another.”45  These rules help ensure that the search will 
be carefully tailored to its justifications and will not result in a general 
rummaging through a suspect’s property.46 
The dictates of the Fourth Amendment have been consistently 
applied to searches and seizures for many years.  Their application to 
computer searches, however, is a recent development.  With the vast 
amounts of technological data that can be stored in a computer, com-
mentators have debated that current laws need to be amended so that 
the Fourth Amendment still protects citizens against overly broad 
searches.47  Professor Orin Kerr suggested that applying existing 
Fourth Amendment principles to digital evidence is a troublesome en-
deavor.48  He argued that searching through a computer is roughly 
 
41 Id. at 267. 
42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
43 Id. 
44 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (describing the underlying 
rationale for prohibiting the execution of a general or overly broad warrant). 
45 See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (describing the Supreme Court’s 
rational behind the particularity requirement). 
46 See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (explaining that the scope of a lawful 
search is defined by the object of the search and the place in which there is probable cause to 
believe that it may be found). 
47 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1017 (2010) (discussing how Fourth Amendment protections cur-
rently apply to the internet). 
48 See Kerr, supra note 2, at 289. 
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analogous to searching for a needle in a haystack,49 and that new rules 
must be developed to regulate how investigators look through the hay-
stack to find the needle.50  While professor Kerr was mostly concerned 
with overbroad searches, he also addressed the issue of how these 
overbroad searches result in forensic examinations that take an unrea-
sonable amount of time to complete.51  Kerr contended that existing 
rules only focus on a suspect’s property interest rather than a suspect’s 
privacy interest.52  As a result, “the police can keep the [evidence] and 
continue to search it without apparent limit.”53  According to Professor 
Kerr, while existing rules may be acceptable for a search of physical 
property, they reflect a general “[in]attention to the legitimate interests 
that [a suspect may] have in [his] computer and files.”54 
IV. THE FORENSIC ANALYSIS: A TWO-STEP PROCESS 
After a magistrate judge has determined that a warrant applica-
tion is sufficiently particularized and supported by probable cause, the 
police will execute the warrant.55  A search for digital evidence is a 
two-step process.56  The first step, known as the “physical search 
stage,” occurs when the police enter the location to be searched and 
seize the electronic storage devices implicated by the warrant.57  This 
on-site seizure commonly includes the confiscation of computers, 
disks, CD-ROMs, and other electronic devices that may contain rele-
vant evidence.58  In most cases, agents will either create an “image 
copy” of the hard drive or seize the electronic devices for a later search 
of the hardware.59 
 
49 Id. at 301. 
50 Id. (“If no rules regulate how investigators look through the haystack to find the needle, 
any justification for a search may justify an invasive look through computer files that repre-
sent a small city’s worth of private information.”). 
51 Id. at 305. 
52 Id. at 306. 
53 Kerr, supra note 2, at 306. 
54 Id. 
55 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing in pertinent part: “[N]o warrants shall issue, but up-
on probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”). 
56 Corey J. Mantei, Pornography and Privacy in Plain View: Applying the Plain View 
Doctrine to Computer Searches, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 985, 1006 (2011) (describing the tech-
niques utilized by law enforcement agents for searching a computer’s file system). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1006-07. 
59 Id. at 1007. 
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The second stage, known as the “electronic search stage,” oc-
curs when the government conducts a forensic examination of the 
seized digital storage device.60  This process almost always occurs off-
site (at a police crime laboratory) and is normally executed by special-
ized computer technicians after the initial physical seizure.61  The elec-
tronic search stage usually requires that the computer be taken off-site 
to be thoroughly searched because in a majority of cases, forensic 
analysis of a hard drive takes too long to perform on-site during the 
initial execution of a search warrant.62 
Examining a computer for evidence of a crime is a rather time 
consuming process.  Even if the police know specific information 
about the files they seek, the data may be encrypted, mislabeled, stored 
in hidden directories, or embedded in “slack space”63 that may not be 
discovered absent a full forensic examination.64  Furthermore, evidence 
of a crime may not always be located within a file.65  It may be hidden 
deep within the computer’s data, rendering the evidence extremely dif-
ficult to locate and retrieve without the appropriate tools and time.66  It 
can potentially take weeks to find the specific information described in 
the warrant because computer storage devices can contain extraordi-
nary amounts of information.67  Because examining a computer for 
digital evidence of a crime is complex and time consuming, it is unre-
alistic to conduct a thorough on-site search of a computer or any other 
electronic media device.68  For these reasons, courts have approved the 
 
60 Id. 
61 Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1241, 1248 (2010) (describing how computer searches differ from traditional searches). 
62 Id. at 1249. 
63 See United States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 142-43 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) 
(“Deleted files are not wholly removed from the computer.  A deleted file is marked as unal-
located file space, which allows that file to be overwritten by new files.  A computer’s delet-
ed files make up what is known . . . as the disk slack space.”). 
64 See United States v. Hill, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d 459 
F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 530-31 (E.D. 
Va. 1999) (noting that criminals intentionally mislabel files or attempt to bury incriminating 
files within innocuously named directories). 
65 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 76, available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL]. 
66 Id. 
67 See Hill, 459 F.3d at 974-75 (“[T]he officers would have to examine every one of what 
may be thousands of files on a disk—a process that could take many hours and perhaps 
days.”). 
68 In cases involving large quantities of paper documents, courts have traditionally al-
lowed investigators to remove the documents to an off-site location for review to determine 
9
Bartholomew: Seize First, Search Later
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
1036 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
removal of computers to an off-site location for review, but so far have 
been unable to reach a consensus on the permissible time period for 
examining seized media.69 
V. PERMISSIBLE TIME PERIOD FOR EXAMINING SEIZED MEDIA 
Statutes that require the timely execution of a search warrant 
ensure that probable cause still exists at the time of the search.70  A de-
lay in executing a search warrant may render the probable cause de-
termination stale.71 
Many courts have agreed that neither the Fourth Amendment 
nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure place explicit limits on 
the duration of any forensic analysis and have upheld forensic analyses 
that were conducted months after investigators lawfully seized a com-
puter.72  The absence of a specific time period for a forensic examina-
tion of electronically stored data is confirmed by the most recent 
amendment to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the 
seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or 
copying of electronically stored information.  Unless 
otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later re-
view of the media or information consistent with the 
 
which of them fall within the scope of the warrant.  See United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 
609, 616 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding the seizure of an entire file cabinet when such seizure 
was motivated by the impracticability of on-site sorting). 
69 See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (providing that the nar-
rowest definable search and seizure reasonably likely to obtain the evidence described in a 
warrant is, in most instances, the seizure and subsequent off-premises search of the computer 
and all available disks); United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he af-
fidavit explained why it was necessary to seize the entire computer system in order to exam-
ine the electronic data for contraband.  It also justified taking the entire system off site be-
cause of the time, expertise, and controlled environment required for a proper analysis.”).  
See also United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) (“[U]ntil technology 
and law enforcement expertise render on-site computer records searching both possible and 
practical, wholesale seizures, if adequately safeguarded, must occur.”). 
70 People v. Kibblewhite, 178 Cal. App. 3d 783, 785 (Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
71 United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1997). 
72 See United States v. Burns, No. 07CR556, 2008 WL 4542990, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
29, 2008) (upholding a ten month delay); United States v. Gorrell, 360 F. Supp. 2d 48, 55 n.5 
(D.D.C. 2004) (upholding a ten month delay); United States v. Hernandez, 183 F. Supp.2d 
468, 480-81 (D.P.R. 2002) (upholding a six week delay); United States v. Triumph Capital 
Grp., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 66 (D. Conn. 2002) (providing that as long as the time was rea-
sonable under the circumstances, a search of weeks or months does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment). 
10
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warrant.  The time for executing the warrant in Rule 
41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(1)(A) refers to the seizure or on-site 
copying of the media or information, and not to any lat-
er off-site copying or review.73 
This section of Rule 41 was amended in 2009, as courts became aware 
that computers and other electronic storage media commonly contain 
such large amounts of information, all of which is impractical for law 
enforcement to review during execution of the warrant at the search lo-
cation.74  However, the amendment still does not impose any rule as to 
when investigators must begin a forensic examination involving elec-
tronically stored information, nor does it impose a time limit or dead-
line on the duration of such a search: 
[T]he practical reality is that there is no “one size fits 
all” presumptive period.  A substantial amount of time 
can be involved in the forensic imaging and review of 
information.  This is due to the sheer size of the storage 
capacity of media, difficulties created by encryption 
and booby traps, and the workload of the computer 
labs.  The rule does not prevent a judge from imposing 
a deadline for the return of the storage media or access 
to the electronically stored information at the time the 
warrant is issued.  However, to arbitrarily set a pre-
sumptive time period for the return could result in fre-
quent petitions to the court for additional time.75 
For these reasons, the current version of Rule 41 does not place explic-
it limitations on when the search of the media must occur.  As long as 
the subsequent search is “consistent with the warrant,” it is considered 
valid.76 
Although Rule 41 does not set forth a specific time period for 
which seized media may be examined, the Fourth Amendment does 
require that forensic analysis of a computer be conducted within a rea-
sonable time.77  In determining the reasonableness of the time for con-
 
73 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
74 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 See United States v. Mutschelknaus, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1077 (D.N.D. 2008) (“[T]he 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require that the forensic analysis of computers 
and other electronic equipment take place within a specific time limit.  Any subsequent 
search only needs to be conducted within a reasonable time.”).  See also Burns, 2008 WL 
11
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ducting a forensic analysis, courts have recognized that the examina-
tion of computer data is a difficult and lengthy process.78  Some courts 
have treated the dissipation of probable cause as the best indicator of 
the reasonableness of a search’s length.79  Thus, as long as probable 
cause to believe that the seized media contains contraband still exists at 
the time of the forensic examination, the search will not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.80 
While the reasonableness requirement is a rather flexible 
standard governing off-site searches, some courts have attempted to 
limit the forensics process to prevent a “general rummaging through 
seized computers.”81  For example, some magistrate judges have begun 
to issue warrants seeking to seize computers on the condition that the 
government adheres to certain restrictions on the subsequent search.82  
Some judges have refused to sign search warrants authorizing the sei-
zure of computers unless the government conducts the forensic exami-
nation in a short period of time, such as thirty days.83  One magistrate 
judge even refused the government’s request for a warrant to search a 
computer unless the government first agreed to abide by preapproved 
search methods to ensure that the search was constitutionally reasona-
ble.84 
Current law does not expressly authorize judges to issue war-
 
4542990, at *8 (“A delay must be reasonable, but there is no constitutional upper limit on 
reasonableness.”). 
78 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. 
79 See United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The Fourth Amend-
ment itself ‘contains no requirements about when the search or seizure is to occur or the du-
ration.’  However, ‘unreasonable delay in the execution of a warrant that results in the lapse 
of probable cause will invalidate a warrant.’ ”) (citations omitted). 
80 See United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1173 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the 
delay in forensically analyzing the seized evidence did not have an effect on the probable 
cause determination); see also Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 211 F.R.D. at 66 (“Delay in exe-
cuting a warrant beyond the time set forth in [FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)] is not unreasona-
ble unless, at the time it is executed, probable cause no longer exists and the defendant 
demonstrates legal prejudice as a result of the delay.”). 
81 Kerr, supra note 2, at 315. 
82 Id. 
83 See United States v. Brunette, 76 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D. Me. 1999) (noting that the 
magistrate judge permitted agents to seize the computers of a child pornography suspect on 
the condition that the agents searched through the computers for evidence within thirty 
days). 
84 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d. 953, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (re-
quiring the government to provide a protocol outlining the methods it would use to ensure 
that its search was reasonably designed to focus on documents related to the criminal activi-
ty). 
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rants that place rigid time restraints on law enforcement’s subsequent 
examination of seized evidence, and whether such limits should be im-
posed remains an open question—especially in light of the recent 
amendment to Rule 41.85  Amidst all the ambiguity regarding off-site 
searches of electronic data, one thing is perfectly clear—a valid war-
rant entitles investigators to seize computers and search them off-site at 
a later date. 
VI. FEDERAL APPROACH 
Currently, many federal courts apply a “reasonableness” stand-
ard in determining if a delay between the initial seizure of the comput-
er and the subsequent search of its data was constitutional.86  The Unit-
ed States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently 
decided United States v. Metter, a case that “may impact electronic 
discovery in future criminal investigations.”87  In 2010, the govern-
ment indicted the defendant, Metter, and six others, alleging that he 
had participated in a fraudulent scheme relating to transactions in the 
common stock of Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc., a company 
where he was the president and CEO.88  Pursuant to a search warrant, 
the government seized computers from both the Spongetech offices 
and Metter’s home.89  This included, among other things, sixty-one 
computer hard drives, the company email server, and contents of Met-
ter’s four personal hard drives.90  With respect to the seized computer 
hard drives, the government created copies of the data and promptly 
returned the computer to its appropriate owner, but the government did 
not conduct a forensic examination of the hard drives until fifteen 
months after it executed the search warrant.91 
Metter filed a motion to suppress the seized materials, arguing 
that “the government’s significant delay in conducting off-site searches 
of the evidence merit[ed] blanket suppression of all seized and imaged 
evidence” because a delay of fifteen months was unreasonable and 
would violate the Fourth Amendment.92  The government’s contention 
 
85 DOJ MANUAL, supra note 62, at 93-94. 
86 See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
87 860 F. Supp. 2d 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
88 Id. at 206. 
89 Id. at 209. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 210-11. 
92 Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 211. 
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was that the wholesale seizure of hard drives and the subsequent off-
site review of such data were necessary given the digital nature of the 
evidence.93  With respect to the delay between the seizure and forensic 
analysis, the government argued that “its prompt return of the original 
electronic evidence . . . negate[d] any harm arising out of its delayed 
review of the imaged evidence.”94 
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York began 
its discussion by noting that this was a case of first impression for the 
Second Circuit.95  The question before the court was whether the gov-
ernment’s retention of the seized electronics for a fifteen-month span 
before conducting the forensic search violated the Fourth Amend-
ment’s privacy protections.96  The court determined that the answer to 
this question required a careful case-by-case factual analysis “because 
what may be appropriate under one set of facts and circumstances may 
not be so under another.”97  That being said, the court found that the 
government’s “more than fifteen-month delay” in reviewing the im-
aged copy of the seized electronic evidence, under the facts and cir-
cumstances of this particular case, constituted an unreasonable seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment: 
An image of an electronic document contains all of the 
same information as the original electronic document.  
To the extent the owner or custodian of the electronic 
document has privacy concerns regarding the govern-
ment’s retention of the original document, the owner 
would have identical privacy concerns with the gov-
ernment’s retention of the imaged document.  For ex-
ample, the seizure of a personal email account could . . . 
yield personal communications between a cheating 
spouse and his or her paramour or communications be-
tween an individual and his or her family regarding an 
embarrassing medical condition.  These hypothetical 
communications clearly fall outside the scope of the 
search warrants in this case . . . .  Thus, the govern-




95 Id. at 212. 
96 Id. 
97 Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 212. 
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nications presents the same privacy concerns as would 
the government’s retention of the original communica-
tions.98 
However, the court acknowledged that searching a computer 
for evidence of a crime presents a “complex situation, given the ex-
traordinary number of documents a computer can contain and store and 
the owner’s ability to password protect and/or encrypt files, docu-
ments, and electronic communications.”99  Thus, law enforcement 
should be permitted some flexibility and latitude in reviewing electron-
ic evidence.100  The correct standard, therefore, in determining whether 
the government acted appropriately with regard to an off-site forensic 
search is a flexible one—reasonableness.101 
Applying this standard, the court found that the government’s 
delay in reviewing the seized evidence was unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances.102  It noted that while numerous cases have held that a 
several-month delay between the initial seizure of electronic evidence 
and the completion of the government’s review of that evidence may 
be reasonable in some cases,103 the court found no authority indicating 
that the government may seize electronic data and then retain that data 
indefinitely without any plans to begin the forensic analysis.104  Thus, 
the court found that the government’s “blatant disregard for its respon-
sibility” to begin a prompt forensic analysis of the imaged evidence, 
under these circumstances, was unreasonable.105 
The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, 
in United States v. Hernandez,106 also employed the standard of rea-
sonableness in determining whether a delay in the forensic analysis of 
seized computer data violated the Fourth Amendment.  In Hernandez, 
the court noted that “[n]either [Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure] nor the Fourth Amendment provides for a specific time 
limit in which a computer may undergo a government forensic exami-
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 213. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 214 (citing United States v. Graziano, 558 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“[T]he manner of the execution of the warrant in searching the computer also will be sub-
ject to judicial review under a ‘reasonableness’ standard.”)). 




106 183 F. Supp. 2d 468 (D.P.R. 2002). 
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nation after it has been seized pursuant to a search warrant.”107  It also 
recognized that in many cases, the forensic search of the computer 
takes place at a different location from where the computer was initial-
ly seized due to the sheer volume of information contained within the 
files.108  According to the court in Hernandez, the same principle is ap-
plied when a search warrant is executed for voluminous documents.109  
“The documents are seized within the time frame established in the 
warrant but examination of these documents may take a longer time, 
and extensions or additional warrants are not required.”110  The exami-
nation of the seized documents at a later date does not automatically 
make the evidence subject to suppression.111  The rationale that certain 
searches may be conducted off-site has been extended to include com-
puters.112  The court in Hernandez concluded that because the search of 
defendant’s home took place within the time period specified in the 
warrant, it was reasonable for the government to take additional time 
to inspect the images in the floppy disk, especially after already having 
discovered child pornography in the defendant’s hard disk.113 
Similarly, the court in United States v. Mutschelknaus114 also 
addressed the issue of whether a delayed forensic search violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  In that case, the defendant, Chad Allen 
Mutschelknaus, was charged with possessing and distributing materials 
involving the sexual exploitation of minors.115  Investigators submitted 
a warrant application and supporting affidavit to a magistrate judge for 
permission to search the defendant’s residence.116  The application 
specifically requested that law enforcement “be allowed to conduct the 
forensic search of the computer and electronic storage media after the 
execution and return of the search warrant.”117  The judge granted the 
search warrant and ordered that the search be conducted “on or before 
 




111 Hernandez, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 480. 
112 Id. at 480-81 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, No. 97-192, 1999 WL 815818, at *9 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 1999)). 
113 Id. at 481. 
114 564 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D.N.D. 2008). 
115 Id. at 1073-74. 
116 Id. at 1074. 
117 Id. (emphasis added). 
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December 22, 2007.”118  The warrant was executed on December 12, 
2007, and the forensic analysis of the seized computer was conducted 
between December 14, 2007, and February 12, 2008.119 
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
from that search, contending, inter alia, that the forensic analysis of the 
computer and electronic media was an unreasonable search in violation 
of Rule 41(e)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be-
cause the forensic search “was conducted more than ten days after the 
issuance of the search warrant.”120  The District Court for the District 
of North Dakota rejected this argument.121  Relying instead on the 
analysis in Hernandez, the court held that the Fourth Amendment only 
requires that the subsequent forensic examination of the computer be 
made within a reasonable time.122  The court recognized “that a search 
of computer data involves much more preparation than an ordinary 
search . . . and that the search may involve much more information.”123  
Applying the reasonableness standard, the court in Mutschelknaus con-
cluded that because the computer and electronic media were seized 
within the time limit established in the search warrant and the forensic 
analysis took place within the time period granted by the magistrate 
judge, the evidence would not be suppressed.124  The court did not lim-
it its holding on the fact that the forensic analysis was conducted with-
in the time period established by the magistrate judge.  Instead, the 
court held that “[a]ny subsequent search only needs to be conducted 
within a reasonable time.”125 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s holding, finding that “[b]ecause of the nature of this evi-
dence, the . . . delay in searching the media did not alter the probable 
cause analysis.”126  Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit found that the po-
lice did not act in bad faith, or “show a reckless disregard for proper 
procedure.”127  The court recognized that searches of computers take 
 
118 Id. 
119 Mutschelknaus, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 
120 Id. at 1076. 
121 Id. at 1077. 
122 Id. at 1076-77. 
123 Id. at 1076. 
124 Mutschelknaus, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1077. 
125 Id. (emphasis added). 
126 United States v. Mutschelknaus, 592 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Brewer, 588 F.3d at 1173). 
127 Id. 
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longer than ordinary searches and that other courts have permitted the 
delay in the execution of search warrants involving computers “be-
cause of the complexity of the search.”128 
The Eighth Circuit applied the reasonableness standard again in 
United States v. Brewer.129  In Brewer, the court concluded that the de-
lay in forensically analyzing the seized evidence did not have any ef-
fect on the probable cause determination.130  The court stated that the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s unreasonable delay standard is to 
prevent the execution of a stale warrant.131  A warrant becomes stale if 
the information supporting the warrant is not “sufficiently close in time 
to the issuance of the warrant and the subsequent search conducted so 
that probable cause can be said to exist as of the time of the search.”132  
Important factors that a court should consider in determining whether 
probable cause has dissipated include the type of the criminal activity 
involved, the extent of the delay, and whether the seized property is 
physical or digital in nature.133  The court in Brewer found that the dig-
ital nature of the evidence justified the several months’ delay in foren-
sically examining the evidence and that such a delay did not alter the 
probable cause analysis.134  Probable cause for believing that the media 
contained child pornography existed at the time the warrant was exe-
cuted, and therefore, the forensic examination at issue in Brewer did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.135 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
United States v. Syphers136 also held that a delay in execution of the 
warrant under Rule 41 did not automatically render seized evidence in-
admissible.137  The First Circuit noted that “[c]ourts have permitted 
some delay in the execution of search warrants involving computers 
because of the complexity of the search.”138  The court in Syphers held 
that the five-month delay in examining the appellant’s computer did 
not merit suppression of the seized evidence because the appellant 
 
128 Id. 
129 588 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2009). 
130 Id. at 1173. 
131 Id. at 1172-73. 
132 Id. at 1173 (quoting United States v. Palega, 556 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
133 Id. 
134 Brewer, 588 F.3d at 1173. 
135 Id. 
136 426 F.3d 461 (1st Cir. 2005). 
137 Id. at 469. 
138 Id. 
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failed to demonstrate that the delay altered the probable cause determi-
nation or that law enforcement acted in bad faith to evade constitution-
al requirements.139 
The reasonableness standard also renders it unlikely that a fed-
eral court will impose specific time limitations that would restrain law 
enforcement’s ability to acquire incriminating evidence.  For example, 
in United States v. Gorrell,140 the court rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment that the data recovered from the computers and camera was in-
admissible due to the ten-month delay in processing.141  The court 
found that the warrant at issue in Gorrell did not limit or specify the 
time period in which the government was required to conduct its foren-
sic analysis of the seized property and that other courts have declined 
to impose “such a prophylactic constraint on law enforcement.”142  
Thus, although the delay in Gorrell was extensive, it did not render the 
forensic search beyond the scope of the warrant to the extent that the 
evidence should have been suppressed.143 
Finally, in United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc.,144 the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that a 
“[d]elay in executing a warrant beyond the time set forth in [Rule 41] 
is not unreasonable unless, at the time it is executed, probable cause no 
longer exists and the defendant demonstrates legal prejudice as a result 
of the delay.”145  In Triumph, the warrant authorized a forensic search 
that could have potentially taken weeks or months.146  The court ex-
plained that as long as the time period for the forensic search was “rea-
sonable under the circumstances,” such a delay would not be unconsti-
tutional.147  The court further noted that “neither Rule 41 nor the 
Fourth Amendment impose any time limitation on the government’s 
forensic examination of the evidence seized.”148  According to the 
court, “computer searches are not, and cannot be subject to any rigid 
time limit because they may involve much more information than an 
ordinary document search, more preparation and a greater degree of 
 
139 Id. 
140 360 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2004). 
141 Id. at 55 n.5. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 211 F.R.D. 31 (D. Conn. 2002). 
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care in their execution.”149  Thus, the court in Triumph concluded that 
the search in that case was not unreasonable.150 
Many federal courts decline to impose rigid restraints and time 
limitations on law enforcement efforts to procure digital evidence from 
lawfully seized electronics.  Indeed, most federal courts agree that as 
long as a search is reasonable under the circumstances, evidence dis-
covered in a subsequent forensic search of electronic data will general-
ly be admissible.  Accordingly, the reasonableness of a search will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and will usually depend on many 
factors, including the nature of the crime, the delay between the initial 
seizure and the subsequent search, the prejudice to the defendant, the 
government’s good faith, and—of course—whether probable cause 
still exists at the time of the forensic search. 
VII. THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
DeProspero presented a novel issue for the New York State 
Court of Appeals.  As the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged, 
neither the Fourth Amendment nor [the New York 
State Constitution] specifically limit the length of time 
property may be held following a lawful seizure.  Nor is 
such a limitation evident from the text of New York’s 
statute governing the disposition of evidence obtained 
by warrant.  But the statutory omission is likely no 
more than a concession to the impossibility of usefully 
prescribing uniform limitations in this context.151 
Thus, although the constitutionality of delayed forensic searches is an 
emerging issue in New York, the court declined to impose uniform 
time limitations on law enforcement.  Consequently, the existence of 
probable cause seems to be the keystone in upholding the constitution-
ality of a delayed forensic search. 
For example, the continued existence of probable cause was the 
linchpin of the Monroe County Court’s decision in People v. Loorie.152  
In that case, the defendants, Debra Loorie and Stuart Sonnendecker, 
 
149 Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 211 F.R.D. at 66. 
150 Id. 
151 DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 267. 
152 630 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1995). 
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were co-owners of the Hilton Pharmacy.153  The two defendants were 
indicted for stealing more than $50,000 from the Rochester Area Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield by billing the two insurance companies for cer-
tain drug prescriptions that were not actually supplied to customers.154  
A search warrant was executed, authorizing the police to examine any 
pharmacy computers and hard drives for evidence relating to the 
crime.155  The computer, the backup disks, and several dozen external 
floppy disks were removed from the premises and were subsequently 
examined by the police.156 
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence discovered 
during the forensic search of the computer.157  Their primary conten-
tion was that law enforcement “exceeded the scope of the warrant” by 
subsequently examining the contents of the computer’s disk drive and 
floppy disks.158  They argued that the warrant only authorized law en-
forcement to seize the computer and, therefore, that a second warrant 
was required in order for the police to search for evidence contained 
within the hard drives.159  The question before the court was whether 
the police were required to obtain a second search warrant explicitly 
authorizing the search of the contents of the seized computer and flop-
py disks.160 
The Monroe County Court began its discussion by acknowl-
edging that “this [was] a case of first impression.”161  Relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ross,162 the court in 
Loorie determined that the police did not need to obtain a second 
search warrant in order to conduct a subsequent forensic examination 
of the seized property.163  In Ross, the Supreme Court stated, 
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to 
the entire area in which the object of the search may be 
found and is not limited by the possibility that separate 
acts of entry or opening may be required to complete 
 








161 Id. at 483. 
162 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
163 Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85. 
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the search.  Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to 
search a home for illegal weapons also provides author-
ity to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in 
which the weapon might be found. . . .  This rule ap-
plies equally to all containers.164 
Drawing upon this language, the court in Loorie held that any contain-
er165—including a hard drive—that is the subject of a properly issued 
warrant may be thoroughly searched if it is reasonable to believe that it 
could conceal the type of evidence specified in the warrant.166  Accord-
ingly, the court held that the police did not exceed the scope of the 
warrant by conducting a subsequent search of the hard drives because 
it was reasonable for the police to believe that the disks contained the 
type of evidence that was the subject of the search warrant.167  The 
court concluded that a second search warrant was not necessary for the 
police to review the items that were lawfully seized.168 
Similarly, in People v. Burke,169 the defendant, who was 
charged with numerous sex-related offenses involving children, moved 
to suppress evidence obtained from his home pursuant to a search war-
rant.170  The warrant authorized the police to search Burke’s home for 
evidence of child pornography, including journals, computer disks, and 
photographic equipment.171  During the search, the police seized a 
green metal box containing sexually explicit photographs of children 
as well as two videotapes.172  The detectives subsequently examined 
the contents of the videotapes and discovered that they contained evi-
 
164 Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-22. 
165 A container is defined as any object used for or capable of holding, for transport or 
storage, such as a carton, box, etc.  Container Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/container?s=t (last visited May 2, 2014). 
166 Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 485.  See also Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 (“The scope of a warrant-
less search . . . is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secret-
ed.  Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable 
cause to believe that it may be found.”). 
167 Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 486.  See also United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 378 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (“[W]hen the police take custody of any sort of container . . . it is reasonable to 
search the container to itemize the property to be held by the police.  [This reflects] the un-
derlying principle that the [F]ourth [A]mendment proscribes only unreasonable searches.”) 
(first emphasis added). 
168 Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 486. 
169 690 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1999). 
170 Id. at 905. 
171 Id. at 901. 
172 Id. 
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dence of the defendant engaging in sexual acts with children.173  The 
defendant was arrested and charged with numerous counts of sodomy, 
promoting and possessing an obscene sexual performance of a child, 
and endangering the welfare of a child.174 
Burke sought suppression of the videotapes, contending that 
the search of his home violated the Fourth Amendment.175  Specifical-
ly, the defendant argued that the police were not authorized to examine 
the contents of the various videotapes.176  The Kings County Court re-
jected this argument and denied Burke’s motion to suppress the two 
videotapes.177  The court first noted that the police are frequently per-
mitted to seize items not specified in the warrant as long as “the war-
rant authorized the seizure of that type of property.”178  According to 
the court, once the police observed that the videotapes were comingled 
in a box containing sexually explicit photos, they could reasonably be-
lieve that the videotapes also contained evidence of child pornogra-
phy.179  The court held that the videotapes were “containers” because 
they are storage mediums for potentially explicit images, and as such, 
the police are permitted to search their contents.180  Also relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ross, the court concluded that, under the 
circumstances, the police were reasonable in examining the contents of 
the videotapes to determine whether the tapes contained child pornog-
raphy.181 
Other New York cases involving the constitutionality of de-
layed searches revolved around the defendant’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  For example, in People v. Ramirez-Portoreal,182 the Court 
 
173 Id. at 901-02. 
174 Burke, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 899. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 905. 
177 Id. at 905-06. 
178 Id. at 905 (emphasis added). 
179 Burke, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 905. 
180 Id. at 905-06. 
Just as the search of the green box was authorized because there was rea-
son to believe that it could contain the specified, illicit photographs, 
there was reason to believe that the videotape cassettes found in the 
green box may have served as ‘containers’—i.e., a storage medium—for 
illicit moving images similar in type to the photographs specified in the 
warrant. 
Id. 
181 Id. at 906. 
182 666 N.E.2d 207 (N.Y. 1996). 
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of Appeals reiterated the basic requirement that in New York, a de-
fendant seeking suppression of evidence must establish “that he or she 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or item that was 
searched.”183  A constitutionally protected privacy interest requires the 
existence of a subjective expectation of privacy that society is willing 
to recognize as reasonable.184  Thus, the reasonable expectation inquiry 
has both objective and subjective components. 
However, privacy concerns are not implicated “when the police 
simply [look] again at what they had already lawfully seen.”185  The 
forensic analysis of a blood sample and a forensic analysis of a com-
puter are analogous.  In both scenarios, a valid search warrant or sub-
poena authorizes the seizure of the blood sample or computer.  Once 
such property has been lawfully seized, privacy concerns are no longer 
relevant because the suspect can no longer reasonably expect the con-
tents of such property to remain private.  The seizure of the property 
necessarily implies that such property will ultimately be searched or 
examined.  The mere fact that the search occurs at a later date is insuf-
ficient to restore a legitimate expectation of privacy in the seized 
item.186  For example, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. 
King187 addressed the privacy concerns of a defendant’s blood sample 
after it had been legally seized, but before it was fully examined.188  
The court held: 
It is [] clear that once a person’s blood sample has been 
obtained lawfully, he can no longer assert either privacy 
claims or unreasonable search and seizure arguments 
with respect to the use of that sample.  Privacy concerns 
are no longer relevant once the sample has already law-
fully been removed from the body, and the scientific 
analysis of a sample does not involve any further search 
and seizure of a defendant’s person.  In this regard we 
note that the defendant could not plausibly assert any 
expectation of privacy with respect to the scientific 
 
183 Id. at 213. 
184 Id. 
185 See People v. Natal, 553 N.E.2d 239, 241 (N.Y.1990) (“In that the greater intrusion 
was justified, . . . the lesser related intrusion [can] not be said to unduly trespass upon any 
remaining expectation of privacy.”). 
186 See People v. Perel, 315 N.E.2d 452, 469 (N.Y. 1974). 
187 663 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997). 
188 Id. at 614. 
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analysis of a lawfully seized item of tangible property, 
such as a gun or a controlled substance.  Although hu-
man blood, with its unique genetic properties, may ini-
tially be quantitatively different from such evidence, 
once constitutional concerns have been satisfied, a 
blood sample is not unlike other tangible property 
which can be subject to a battery of scientific tests.189 
Thus, pursuant to King, once an item of property is lawfully seized 
pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause, the police can take 
a more detailed look of what they already seized because the defendant 
no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy.190 
In New York, the constitutionality of delayed forensic searches 
is a contemporary issue that revolves around a rather traditional con-
cept—the expectation of privacy.  While establishing the existence of a 
privacy interest is a prerequisite to a Fourth Amendment challenge, 
most New York courts agree that such privacy interests no longer exist 
after a suspect’s property has been seized pursuant to a valid warrant.  
The foregoing cases stand for the proposition that it is permissible for 
law enforcement to examine the contents of a suspect’s seized elec-
tronic media at a later date, so long as probable cause existed at the 
time the property was seized. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
People v. DeProspero addressed the growing concern of the ef-
fect that emerging technology has on the interpretation and scope of 
the Fourth Amendment.  With new technology underway, courts are 
forced to analyze the constitutionality of searches and seizures in a 
new light.  While a search for physical evidence is a single-step pro-
cess, i.e., a home is searched and the evidence is seized, a computer 
search involves a two-step process by which the computer is seized 
and then subsequently it is forensically searched for evidence.191  There 
is no bright-line test for determining if a delay in forensic analysis re-
sults in an unreasonable search.  Most federal courts seem to agree that 
if probable cause still exists, the warrant will still be valid.  Further-
more, the amendments that were made to the Federal Rules of Crimi-
 
189 Id. at 615. 
190 Id. at 614. 
191 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee note. 
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nal Procedure in 2009 address these concerns by declining to impose 
rigid time restraints on law enforcement agents during the course of a 
computer search.  Although Rule 41 imposes no time restraints on law 
enforcement officials, this could pose potential problems for the justice 
system.  Time restraints keep a warrant from becoming stale and judg-
es should be encouraged to impose certain restraints, depending on the 
totality of the circumstances of each case.  If a warrant has become 
stale and probable cause no longer exists at the time of the forensic ex-
amination, it may indeed be true that a defendant’s legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy has been restored and, as a result, any subsequent 
search would be unreasonable. 
It is widely acknowledged that the off-site forensic search of 
computers takes much longer than an ordinary search, but this does not 
justify an unreasonable delay in conducting a forensic analysis of 
seized property.  The police and other law enforcement agencies 
should be required to adequately search the contents of seized items 
before charging a suspect with a crime, and to do so within a reasona-
ble period of time.  While courts should not impose any rigid time con-
straints on law enforcement, they should address this issue on a case-
by-case basis, analyzing all relevant factors and circumstances in order 
to fairly balance an individual’s privacy interest with the state’s inter-
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